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Joshua A. SteinFrustrating news has emerged from Washington D.C. as the recently-published federal government’s Fall Semiannual Regulatory Agenda revealed that the long-anticipated U.S. Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”) for regulations governing website accessibility for places of public accommodation under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“Title III”) would not be issued in the Spring of 2016 as most recently anticipated and would instead be delayed until fiscal year 2018.  DOJ now intends to issue a NPRM governing website accessibility for state and local governments under Title II of the ADA in early 2016 and then hopes that that process will create the necessary infrastructure to develop and promulgate similar regulations for entities governed by Title III. 

Such news is particularly troubling given the recent surge in website accessibility actions brought against places of public accommodation and business establishments operating exclusively in cyberspace by private plaintiffs, advocacy groups, and regulators at the federal, state, and local levels.  Indeed, notwithstanding DOJ’s latest delay, there is no indication that the federal government intends to cease its quest to have places of public accommodation provide accessible websites.  Relying upon Title III’s overarching civil rights obligations – most importantly that places of public accommodation provide “full and equal enjoyment” of its goods, services, etc. – DOJ continues to seek website accessibility provisions as part of its settlement agreements with a wide variety of places of public accommodation.  DOJ has even gone so far as to file Statements of Interest in private litigations ongoing between both Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the National Association of the Deaf in the U.S. District Court for Massachusetts opposing their efforts to have the lawsuits dismissed or stayed pending DOJ’s completion of the rulemaking process.  (3:15-CV-30023 (D.Mass) and 3:15-CV-30224 (D.Mass))

The limited number of judicial decisions addressing the applicability of Title III to the websites of places of public accommodation and online businesses do not provide a clear road map for businesses due to the existence of a split body of case law.  The current law falls along three primary lines:  (i) Title III’s application is limited to actual physical places and cannot apply to websites absent an amendment to Title III or the issuance of new regulations; (ii) Title III applies to websites when there is a nexus between a physical place of public accommodation and the goods and services offered on its website; and (iii) Title III applies to even online-only businesses because Title III must be read broadly to promote the ADA’s goal of allowing individuals with disabilities to fully and equally enjoy and participate in society and, therefore, it must evolve to apply to new technologies.  The limited body of case law to date has developed primarily in the preliminary motion to dismiss phase and, therefore, the viability of various potential affirmative defenses or what it means for a website to be accessible has not be sufficiently analyzed by the courts. 

Further complicating the landscape, since DOJ announced its previous delay of the regulations (then into April 2016) this past spring, businesses across most industries – including retail, hospitality, financial services, and sports and entertainment – have been deluged with demand letters from industrious plaintiffs’ firms seeking to take advantage of the regulatory uncertainty and limited case law.  Understanding that the costs of litigating a developing area of the law may prove significant and the return uncertain, many businesses are opting to reach amicable resolutions to these matters rather than explore more aggressive litigation positions.  To the extent others hoped that DOJ guidance would soon stem the tide of these demand letters, this most recent development is disheartening news.  Businesses hoping to avoid such letters are best served by taking prophylactic actions to address the accessibility of their websites.

For more on these issues see: 

http://www.hospitalitylaboremploymentlawblog.com/2015/06/articles/ada/doj-further-delays-release-of-highly-anticipated-proposed-website-accessibility-regulations-for-public-accommodations/

http://www.technologyemploymentlaw.com/ada-and-disability-law/access-board-seeks-to-revise-accessibility-standards-for-information-and-communications-technology-of-federal-agencies-and-certain-technology-manufacturers-moving-to-functionality-based-approach/

http://www.ebglaw.com/joshua-a-stein/news/key-issues-facing-places-of-public-accommodation-at-the-25th-anniversary-of-the-ada/

Service DogThe United States Department of Justice recently released technical guidelines aimed at cur”tail”ing proliferating efforts purporting to expand the meaning of “service animal” under the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Under the ADA, public accommodations (e.g. restaurants, hotels, retail establishments, theaters, and concert halls) must permit the use of service animals by disabled individuals. These technical guidelines take aim at increasing claims that a variety of animals (e.g. a pigs) are service animals because they provide emotional support or comfort to the disabled individual. As this technical guideline makes clear, a service animal must not only be a dog, but it must be working like one as well.

The technical guidelines explain that, under the ADA, a service animal is “a dog that has been individually trained to do work or perform tasks for an individual with a disability.” In addition, the task(s) performed by the dog “must be directly related to the person’s disability.” Applying these definitions, the technical guidelines make clear that dogs (or other animals) that provide comfort through their presence alone do not qualify as service animals under the ADA. To satisfy the requirements of the ADA, the dog must be trained to take a specific action when the disabled individual requires assistance. The technical guideline provides these examples:

  • A person with diabetes may have a dog that is trained to alert him/her when his blood sugar reaches high or low levels;
  • A person with epilepsy may have a dog that is trained to detect the onset of a seizure and then help the person remain safe during the seizure; and
  • A person who suffers anxiety attacks may have a dog that is trained to sense when an attack is about to happen and take a specific action to help avoid or lessen its impact.

Merely providing emotional support and comfort by presence alone is insufficient to qualify a dog as a service animal under the ADA.

The technical guidelines also provide clarification as to the proper inquiries that may be made of a patron seeking to utilize a service animal in a place of public accommodation. In situations where it is not obvious that the dog is a service animal, staff may ask the patron only two specific questions:

  1. Is the dog a service animal required because of a disability?
  2. What work or task has the dog been trained to perform?

Staff may not request supporting documentation for the dog, require the dog to demonstrate the task, or inquire about the nature of the patron’s disability.

Managers of restaurants, hotels, retail establishments and other public accommodations should review the guidelines provided by the Department of Justice in order to more fully understand their rights when presented with a patron claiming need to use a service animal.

My colleagues Nathaniel M. Glasser and Kristie-Ann M. Yamane (a Summer Associate) at Epstein Becker Green have published a Financial Services Employment Law blog post concerning recent modifications to pregnancy discrimination that will be of interest to many of our readers: “EEOC Updates Pregnancy Discrimination Guidance.”

Following is an excerpt:

In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Young v. UPS, [1]  the EEOC has modified those aspects of its Enforcement Guidance on Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues (“Guidance”) that deal with disparate treatment and light duty.

Under the prior guidance, issued in 2014, the EEOC asserted that a pregnant worker could prove a violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) simply by showing that she was “treated differently than a non-pregnant worker similar in his/her ability or inability to work.”  The 2014 guidance also took the position that an employer could not refuse to offer a pregnant worker an accommodation by relying on a policy that provides light duty only to workers injured on the job.  The Supreme Court, however, was highly critical of and rejected this interpretation of the PDA, finding that it would require employers who provide a single worker with an accommodation to provide similar accommodations to all pregnant workers, irrespective of other criteria.

 Read the full original post here.

My colleague Nathaniel M. Glasser recently authored Epstein Becker Green’s Take 5 newsletter.   In this edition of Take 5, Nathaniel highlights five areas of enforcement that U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) continues to tout publicly and aggressively pursue.

  1. Religious Discrimination and Accommodation—EEOC Is Victorious in New U.S. Supreme Court Ruling
  2. Transgender Protections Under Title VII—EEOC Relies on Expanded Sex Discrimination Theories
  3. Systemic Investigations and Litigation—EEOC Gives Priority to Enforcement Initiative
  4. Narrowing the “Gender Pay Gap”—EEOC Files Suits Under the Equal Pay Act
  5. Background Checks—EEOC Seeks to Eliminate Barriers to Recruitment and Hiring

Read the Full Take 5 here.

My colleague Joshua A. Stein at Epstein Becker Green has a Hospitality Labor and Employment Law blog post that will be of interest to many of our readers: “DOJ Further Delays Release of Highly Anticipated Proposed Website Accessibility Regulations for Public Accommodations.”

Following is an excerpt:

For those who have been eagerly anticipating the release of the U.S. Department of Justice’s proposed website accessibility regulations for public keyboard-4x3_jpgaccommodations under Title III of the ADA (the “Public Accommodation Website Regulations”), the wait just got even longer.  The recently released Spring 2015 Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions reveals that DOJ’s Public Accommodation Website Regulations are now not expected until April 2016.  This delay moves back the release date nearly a year from what most had previously anticipated; this summer in advance of July’s 25th Anniversary of the ADA.  While there was no public statement explaining the release, most insiders believe it has to do with the difficulty of appropriately quantifying the costs and benefits of complying with any promulgated regulations – a necessary step by DOJ for such a rulemaking.

Read the full original post here.

To register for this complimentary webinar, please click here.

I’d like to recommend an upcoming complimentary webinar, “EEOC Wellness Regulations – What Do They Mean for Employer-Sponsored Programs? (April 22, 2015, 12:00 p.m. EDT) presented by my Epstein Becker Green colleagues Frank C. Morris, Jr. and Adam C. Solander.

Below is a description of the webinar:

On April 16, 2015, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) released its long-awaited proposed regulations governing employer-provided wellness programs under the American’s with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Although the EEOC had not previously issued regulations governing wellness programs, the EEOC has filed a series of lawsuits against employers alleging that their wellness programs violated the ADA. Additionally, the EEOC has issued a number of public statements, which have concerned employers, indicating that the EEOC’s regulation of wellness programs would conflict with the regulations governing wellness programs under the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) and jeopardize the programs currently offered to employees.

During this webinar, Epstein Becker Green attorneys will:

  • summarize the EEOC’s recently released proposed regulations
  • discuss where the EEOC’s proposed regulations are inconsistent with the rules currently in place under the ACA and the implications of the rules on wellness programs
  • examine the requests for comments issued by the EEOC and how its proposed regulations may change in the future
  • provide an analysis of what employers should still be concerned about and the implications of the proposed regulations on the EEOC’s lawsuits against employers

Who Should Attend:

  • Employers that offer, or are considering offering, wellness programs
  • Wellness providers, insurers, and administrators

To register for this complimentary webinar, please click here.

My colleagues Frank C. Morris, Jr., Adam C. Solander, and August Emil Huelle co-authored a Health Care and Life Sciences Client Alert concerning the EEOC’s proposed amendments to its ADA regulations and it is a topic of interest to many of our readers.

Following is an excerpt:

On April 16, 2015, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) released its highly anticipated proposed regulations (to be published in the Federal Register on April 20, 2015, for notice and comment) setting forth the EEOC’s interpretation of the term “voluntary” as to the disability-related inquiries and medical examination provisions of the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Under the ADA, employers are generally barred from making disability-related inquiries to employees or requiring employees to undergo medical examinations. There is an exception to this prohibition, however, for disability-related inquiries and medical examinations that are “voluntary.”

Click here to read the full Health Care and Life Sciences Client Alert.

On March 5, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion in Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 2015 WL 925586 (9th Cir. Mar. 5, 2015) that provides retailers with useful insight into how to manage the issue of “temporary obstructions” to accessible routes under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“Title III”).

Title III’s overarching obligations that retailers provide individuals with disabilities with full and equal enjoyment of their goods and services and engage in ongoing barrier removal include the requirement to provide and maintain accessible routes (generally, a minimum of 36 inches in width) into the store, to merchandise, and to locations such as check-out and service counters, restrooms, fitting rooms, and other amenities.  Title III’s implementing regulations and related Technical Assistance Manuals clarify that isolated and temporary obstructions to the accessible route do not violate the ADA, if infrequent and promptly removed.

Here, Chapman alleged that Pier 1 violated Title III and related state accessibility laws, by, among other things, repeatedly obstructing its aisles with merchandise, furniture, display racks, and ladders.  Chapman encountered such obstructions on eleven separate visits to a Pier 1 store.  In upholding the district court’s finding of summary judgment for Chapman on the obstructed aisle issue, the Ninth Circuit rejected Pier 1’s argument that these allegations should be excused as mere temporary obstructions and thus, did not violate the law.

The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning suggests helpful guidance for retailers looking to avoid similar lawsuits:

  • Adopting policies governing the placement of merchandise to maintain accessible routes, and practices and procedures to help implement those policies (g., regular walks of the store with a tape measure) do not insulate a retailer from liability if, the policies, practices, and procedures are – as in Chapman – ineffective;
  • An obstruction is unlikely to be deemed temporary, if retailers place the onus upon the customer to request its removal;
  • An obstruction will not necessarily be deemed temporary just because it was created by another patron and not the retailer itself – the retailer has an obligation to maintain its accessible routes;
  • Even if individual instances of obstruction when viewed separately might be temporary, a volume of “temporary obstructions” can become sufficiently prevalent to constitute repeated and persistent failures that were not promptly remedied and, thus constitute a violation of Title III; and
  • True temporary obstructions – those that are isolated and transitory in nature – g., maintenance equipment being actively used to make repairs or items currently involved in re-stocking merchandise – remain subject to Title III’s exemption to the accessible route requirements.

For additional information please contact Joshua A. Stein.

In a case emphasizing the importance of acting in good faith in the interactive process and how an employer can do it right, on February 13, 2015, the First Circuit denied the EEOC’s petition for a rehearing en banc of the court’s decision to dismiss a lawsuit brought against Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc. by a diabetic former employee who claimed that her erratic working hours were exacerbating her condition.  EEOC v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 774 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc denied (Feb. 13, 2015).

Pamela Manning, a former sales associate at Kohl’s, had type I diabetes.  For two years, she worked predictable shifts as a full-time sales associate.  Following a restructuring of the staffing system nationwide in January 2010, however, Manning began working a schedule with unpredictable shifts, including some night shifts followed by day shifts (in Kohl’s parlance, “swing shifts”).  Manning alleged that the new schedule aggravated her diabetes.

After informing her supervisor that working erratic shifts was endangering her health, Manning obtained a doctor’s note requesting that she be scheduled to work “a predictable day shift.”  Manning’s store manager contacted human resources to discuss Manning’s request.  Kohl’s determined that it could not provide Manning’s preferred schedule of day-time hours only, but authorized the store manager to offer a schedule with no swing shifts.

On March 31, 2010, during a meeting with her store manager and immediate supervisor, Manning again requested a “steady shift” with mid-day hours, but was told that she could not be given a consistent schedule.  Manning stormed out of the meeting, saying that she had no choice but to quit.  Her supervisor followed her and asked what she could do to help, but she could not convince Manning to reconsider her resignation or to discuss any alternative accommodations.

Two days later, Manning contacted the EEOC to file a charge of discrimination.  On April 9, 2010, the store manager called Manning and asked that she rethink her resignation and consider alternative accommodations for both part-time and full-time work.  Manning ignored this overture and got off the phone as quickly as possible.  A week later, after hearing nothing further Manning, Kohl’s treated her departure as voluntary and terminated her employment.

Based on this record, on December 19, 2014, the First Circuit concluded that Kohl’s made earnest attempts to discuss potential reasonable accommodations.  By contrast, Manning’s conduct constituted a refusal to participate in the interactive process in good faith, warranting summary judgment in favor of Kohl’s.  In addition, the First Circuit ruled against the EEOC on Manning’s constructive discharge claim, finding that a reasonable person would not have felt compelled to resign when her employer offered to discuss other potential work arrangements with her.

In reaching its decision, the First Circuit emphasized that both the employer and the employee have a duty to engage in good faith, and that empty gestures by the employer will not satisfy this duty.  But if an employer does engage in the interactive process in good faith, and the employee refuses or fails to cooperate in the process, the employer cannot be held liable for a failure to provide a reasonable accommodation.

Employers addressing reasonable accommodation requests from their employees can learn from Kohl’s actions in this case.  Kohl’s benefited from its representatives’ diligence in documenting their response to Manning’s request (including the internal discussions) and in following up with Manning to give her an opportunity to propose alternative accommodations for her diabetes.  Thus, even though the store manager never conveyed an offer of “no swing shifts,” the First Circuit was able to find that Kohl’s made real efforts to work with Manning and that Manning unreasonably refused to continue the dialogue with Kohl’s.  And Kohl’s succeeded in winning dismissal of the ADA claim.  Employers who follow this course of conduct ensure their compliance with the ADA and, in the event an employee refuses to reciprocate discussions, may establish a defense to liability in a failure to accommodate lawsuit.

While by most accounts the current term of the Supreme Court is generally uninteresting, lacking anything that the popular media deem to be a blockbuster (the media’s choice being same-sex marriage or Affordable Care Act cases), the docket is heavily weighted towards labor and employment cases and a few that potentially affect retail employers in particular. They are as follows.

The Court already has heard argument in Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, No. 13-433, which concerns whether the Portal-to-Portal Act, which amends the Fair Labor Standards Act, requires employers to pay warehouse employees for the time they spend, which in this case runs up to 25 minutes, going through post-shift anti-theft screening. Integrity is a contractor to Amazon.com, and the 9th Circuit had ruled in against it, holding that the activity was part of the shift and not non-compensable postliminary activity. Interestingly, DOL is on the side of the employer, fearing a flood of FLSA cases generated from any activity in which employees are on the employers’ premises.  This case will affect many of our clients and should be monitored carefully.

On December 3rd, the Court will hear argument in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 12-1226, which poses whether the Pregnancy Discrimination Act requires an employer to accommodate a pregnant woman with work restrictions related to pregnancy in the same manner as it accommodates a non-pregnant employee with the same restrictions, but not related to pregnancy. The 4th Circuit had ruled in favor of the company, which offered a “light duty program” held to be pregnancy blind to persons who have a disability cognizable under the ADA, who are injured on the job or are temporarily ineligible for DOT certification. Ms. Young objects to being considered in the same category as workers who are injured off the job. This case, too, will create a precedent of interest to at least some of our clients. Of  note, this week United Parcel Service sent a memo to employees announcing a change in policy for pregnant workers advising that starting January 1, the company will offer temporary light duty positions not just to workers injured on the job, which is current policy, but to pregnant workers who need it as well. In its brief UPS states “While UPS’s denial of [Young’s] accommodation request was lawful at the time it was made (and thus cannot give rise to a claim for damages), pregnant UPS employees will prospectively be eligible for light-duty assignments.”  The change in policy, UPS states, is the result of new pregnancy accommodation guidelines issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and a growing number of states passing laws mandating reasonable accommodation of pregnant workers.

On October 2nd, the Supreme Court granted cert. in a Title VII religious accommodation case, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 14-86. The case concerns whether an employer is entitled to specific notice, in this case  of a religious practice – the wearing of a head scarf —  from a prospective employee before having the obligation to accommodate her.  In this case, the employer did not hire a Muslim applicant. The Tenth Circuit ruled that the employer was entitled to rely upon its “look” policy and would not presume religious bias where the employee did not raise the underlying issue. Retail clients and others will be affected by the outcome.

More will follow as developments warrant.