Following is an excerpt:

In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Young v. UPS, [1]  the EEOC has modified those aspects of its Enforcement Guidance on Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues (“Guidance”) that deal with disparate treatment and light duty.

Under the prior guidance, issued in 2014, the EEOC asserted that a pregnant worker could prove a violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) simply by showing that she was “treated differently than a non-pregnant worker similar in his/her ability or inability to work.”  The 2014 guidance also took the position that an employer could not refuse to offer a pregnant worker an accommodation by relying on a policy that provides light duty only to workers injured on the job.  The Supreme Court, however, was highly critical of and rejected this interpretation of the PDA, finding that it would require employers who provide a single worker with an accommodation to provide similar accommodations to all pregnant workers, irrespective of other criteria.

 Read the full original post here.

1. Religious Discrimination and Accommodation—EEOC Is Victorious in New U.S. Supreme Court Ruling
2. Transgender Protections Under Title VII—EEOC Relies on Expanded Sex Discrimination Theories
3. Systemic Investigations and Litigation—EEOC Gives Priority to Enforcement Initiative
4. Narrowing the “Gender Pay Gap”—EEOC Files Suits Under the Equal Pay Act
5. Background Checks—EEOC Seeks to Eliminate Barriers to Recruitment and Hiring

Read the Full Take 5 here.

Background

In United States v. Windsor, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) as unconstitutional, finding that Congress did not have the authority to limit a state’s definition of “marriage” to “only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife.”  Significantly, the Windsor decision left intact Section 2 of DOMA (the “Full Faith and Credit Statute”), which provides that no state is required to recognize same-sex marriages from other states.  Further to the President’s directive to implement the Windsor decision in all relevant federal statutes, in June 2014, the DOL proposed rulemaking to update the regulatory definition of spouse under the FMLA. The Final Rule is the result of that endeavor.

As we previously reported, the Final Rule adopts the “place of celebration” rule, thus amending prior regulations which followed the “place of residence” rule to define “spouse.”  For purposes of the FMLA, the place of residence rule determines spousal status under the laws where the couple resides, notwithstanding a valid out-of-state marriage license.   The place of celebration rule, on the other hand, determines spousal status by the jurisdiction in which the couple was married, thus expanding the availability of FMLA leave to more employees seeking leave to care for a same-sex spouse.

The Court’s Decision

Plaintiff States Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Nebraska sued, arguing the DOL exceeded its authority by promulgating a Final Rule that requires them to violate Section 2 of the DOMA and their respective state laws prohibiting the recognition of same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions.  The Texas court ordered the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction to stay the Final Rule pending a full determination of the issue on the merits.

The court first found that the Plaintiff States are likely to succeed on at least one of their claims, which assert that the Final Rule improperly conflicts with (1) the FMLA, which defines “spouse” as “a husband or wife, as the case may be” and which the court found was meant “to give marriage its traditional, complementarian meaning”; (2) the Full Faith and Credit Statute; and/or (3) state laws regarding marriage, which may be preempted by the Final Rule only if Congress intended to preempt the states’ definitions of marriage.

The court then held that the Final Rule would cause Plaintiff States to suffer irreparable harm because, for example, the Final Rule requires Texas agencies to recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages as valid in violation of the Texas Family Code.

Lastly, although finding the threatened injury to both parties to be serious, the court decided that the public interest weighs in favor of a preliminary injunction against the DOL.  The court found in favor of upholding “the stability and consistency of the law” so as to permit a detailed and in-depth examination of the merits.  Additionally, the court pointed out that the injunction does not prohibit employers from granting leave to those who request leave to care for a loved one, but reasoned that a preliminary injunction is required to prevent the DOL “from mandating enforcement of its Final Rule against the states” and to protect the states’ laws from federal encroachment.

What This Means for Employers

Although the stay of the Final Rule is pending a full determination of the issue on the merits, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges likely will expedite and shape the outcome of the Texas court’s final ruling.  In Obergefell, the Supreme Court will address whether a state is constitutionally compelled under the Fourteenth Amendment to recognize as valid a same-sex marriage lawfully licensed in another jurisdiction and to license same-sex marriages.  Oral arguments in Obergefell are scheduled for Tuesday, April 28, 2015, and a final ruling is expected in late June of this year.

Before the U.S. Supreme Court decides Obergefell, however, employers in Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana and Nebraska are advised to develop a compliant strategy for implementing the FMLA—a task that may be easier said than done.  Complicating the matter is a subsequent DOL filing in Texas v. U.S. where the DOL contends that the court’s order was not intended to preclude enforcement of the Final Rule against persons other than the named Plaintiff States, and thus applies only to the state governments of the states of Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Nebraska.

While covered employers are free to provide an employee with non-FMLA unpaid or paid job-protected leave to care for their same-sex partner (or for other reasons), such leave will not exhaust the employee’s FMLA leave entitlement and the employee will remain entitled to FMLA leave for covered reasons.  We recommend that covered employers that are not located and do not have employees living in one of the Plaintiff States amend their FMLA-related documents and otherwise implement policies to comport with the Final Rule, as detailed in EBG’s Act Now Advisory, DOL Extends FMLA Leave to More Same-Sex Couples.  Covered employers who are located or have employees living in one of the Plaintiff States, however, should confer with legal counsel to evaluate the impact of Texas v. U.S. and react accordingly, which may depend on the geographical scope of operations.

Judy Gordon, an officer with the Capitol Police, was granted FMLA leave to address intermittent periods of severe and incapacitating depression.  Before her leave commenced, Gordon’s superiors ordered her to submit to a “fitness for duty examination” because of her FMLA request.  While waiting for the examination, Gordon was reassigned to administrative duties, resulting in a loss of $900 (the equivalent of three days’ pay).  Gordon passed the examination, was reinstated to her prior post, and took the requested FMLA leave and returned without incident.  Nonetheless, Gordon sued, asserting claims of interference and retaliation under the FMLA, and alleging that the presence of the “fitness for duty examination” on her permanent record would be detrimental to her prospects for pay increases, promotions, and transfers.

Addressing an issue of first impression for the D.C. Circuit, the court considered whether Gordon could proceed with her FMLA interference claim even though she was granted and ultimately took the requested leave.  Drawing an analogy between the interference provisions of the FMLA and the NLRA – which courts have interpreted to permit NLRA Section 8 claims based on actions that have a “reasonable tendency” to interfere with employees’ rights, regardless of whether they actual did – the court held that “an employer action with a reasonable tendency” to interfere with an FMLA right may support a valid interference claim “even where the action fails to actually prevent such exercise or attempt.”

Here, the D.C. Circuit reinstated the inference claim because it found that subjecting Gordon to a fitness for duty examination, which resulted in her loss of $900 and potentially impacted her future career prospects, would have a “reasonable tendency” to interfere with an employee’s exercise of FMLA rights.  The court also appeared to be influenced by allegations in the complaint that upper-managers frowned upon FMLA leave generally and were looking for ways to prevent Gordon from taking leave.

In its decision, the court set a low threshold for what constitutes an adverse action sufficient to support an FMLA retaliation claim.  One of the elements of a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation is a showing that the plaintiff was adversely affected by an employment decision.  The court refused to decide whether that element requires a showing of “material adversity” – as articulated for Title VII claims in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68-70 (2006) – or something less, such as any monetary loss, no matter how small – as suggested in Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81 (2002).  Rather, the court concluded that the loss of $900, the equivalent of three days’ pay, was more than de minimis and met the higher “material adversity” threshold, allowing the FMLA retaliation claim to proceed.

This decision is a reminder to employers, particularly those with operations in Washington, DC, to tread carefully when processing requests for leave under the FMLA.  Although leaves of absence can be disruptive to the workforce, and employers are within their rights to make certain inquiries into the need for leave, the mere fact that FMLA leave is ultimately granted will not insulate an employer from potential liability for conduct that has the potential to dissuade an employee from requesting leave.  To avoid unnecessary litigation, employers should instruct their leave administrators and supervisors to refrain from openly questioning or criticizing an employee’s request for leave and from requiring additional certifications beyond those contemplated by the law.

Pamela Manning, a former sales associate at Kohl’s, had type I diabetes.  For two years, she worked predictable shifts as a full-time sales associate.  Following a restructuring of the staffing system nationwide in January 2010, however, Manning began working a schedule with unpredictable shifts, including some night shifts followed by day shifts (in Kohl’s parlance, “swing shifts”).  Manning alleged that the new schedule aggravated her diabetes.

After informing her supervisor that working erratic shifts was endangering her health, Manning obtained a doctor’s note requesting that she be scheduled to work “a predictable day shift.”  Manning’s store manager contacted human resources to discuss Manning’s request.  Kohl’s determined that it could not provide Manning’s preferred schedule of day-time hours only, but authorized the store manager to offer a schedule with no swing shifts.

On March 31, 2010, during a meeting with her store manager and immediate supervisor, Manning again requested a “steady shift” with mid-day hours, but was told that she could not be given a consistent schedule.  Manning stormed out of the meeting, saying that she had no choice but to quit.  Her supervisor followed her and asked what she could do to help, but she could not convince Manning to reconsider her resignation or to discuss any alternative accommodations.

Two days later, Manning contacted the EEOC to file a charge of discrimination.  On April 9, 2010, the store manager called Manning and asked that she rethink her resignation and consider alternative accommodations for both part-time and full-time work.  Manning ignored this overture and got off the phone as quickly as possible.  A week later, after hearing nothing further Manning, Kohl’s treated her departure as voluntary and terminated her employment.

Based on this record, on December 19, 2014, the First Circuit concluded that Kohl’s made earnest attempts to discuss potential reasonable accommodations.  By contrast, Manning’s conduct constituted a refusal to participate in the interactive process in good faith, warranting summary judgment in favor of Kohl’s.  In addition, the First Circuit ruled against the EEOC on Manning’s constructive discharge claim, finding that a reasonable person would not have felt compelled to resign when her employer offered to discuss other potential work arrangements with her.

In reaching its decision, the First Circuit emphasized that both the employer and the employee have a duty to engage in good faith, and that empty gestures by the employer will not satisfy this duty.  But if an employer does engage in the interactive process in good faith, and the employee refuses or fails to cooperate in the process, the employer cannot be held liable for a failure to provide a reasonable accommodation.

Employers addressing reasonable accommodation requests from their employees can learn from Kohl’s actions in this case.  Kohl’s benefited from its representatives’ diligence in documenting their response to Manning’s request (including the internal discussions) and in following up with Manning to give her an opportunity to propose alternative accommodations for her diabetes.  Thus, even though the store manager never conveyed an offer of “no swing shifts,” the First Circuit was able to find that Kohl’s made real efforts to work with Manning and that Manning unreasonably refused to continue the dialogue with Kohl’s.  And Kohl’s succeeded in winning dismissal of the ADA claim.  Employers who follow this course of conduct ensure their compliance with the ADA and, in the event an employee refuses to reciprocate discussions, may establish a defense to liability in a failure to accommodate lawsuit.